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The Rules of the Game: “Play In The Joints” Between the
Religion Clauses
Sharon Keller†

In law, as in life, there is a good deal of ambivalence about playing.
Play, as the portal to innovation and creativity, can be the enemy of settled
expectations and predictability. In the recent case of Locke v. Davey,1 Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, appealed to the “play in the joints”
metaphor famously used in Walz v. Tax Commission of N.Y.2 as an aid in
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2

540 U.S. 712, 124 S.Ct. 1307 (2004)
The Court stated:
The course of constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be an absolutely
straight line; rigidity could well defeat the basic purpose of these provisions,
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constitutional balancing of apparently competing constitutional religion clause
claims, saying:
These two clauses, the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause, are frequently in tension. Yet we have
long said that ‘there is room for play in the joints’ between
them.

In other words, there are some state actions

permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by
the Free Exercise Clause.

3

which is to insure that no religion be sponsored or favored, none commanded,
and none inhibited.

The general principle deducible from the First

Amendment and all that has been said by the Court is this: that we will not
tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental
interference with religion. Short of those expressly proscribed governmental
acts there is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality
which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without
interference.” Walz v. Tax Comm’n of the City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669
(1970).
3

540 U.S. at 718-19; 124 S.Ct at 1311
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One of the more important tasks of law is to define and defend the
expectations we loosely call rights,4 consequently it is unsettling to find “play”
as an operant feature of a legal rule describing the interaction of two important
constitutional clauses -- the clause prohibiting the establishment of religion and
the clause guaranteeing rights to the free exercise of religion.5
This article will analyze the argument of Locke. I will lay out the
significant elements of the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses that
created this tension in Locke and argue that the matter is not as simple as the
Locke majority stated.

Rather, that the legal precedents that the Locke

majority relied upon to resolve the Establishment clause challenge in Locke, in

4

I say “loosely-called rights” not because I will be contending that the term is very

vague, but because one could coherently take a position that the expectations
discussed in this article, particularly those in the discussion regarding conditioned
benefits at section II.C. infra, do not rise to the level of right but are more properly
viewed as “expectations” or “privileges.” These arguments will be addressed in the
aforementioned section. Suffice it to say, for the purposes of the introduction, that it
will be contended in that section that the consequences of such disappointed
expectations need not rise to the level of right to have legal consequences in this
instance.
5

U.S. CONST. AMEND. I
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particular Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,6 relies on presumptions that should
elevate the level of scrutiny and eliminate much of the “play” in respect to the
Free Exercise challenge.
That this question arose in Locke should not be a surprise. Indeed, this
kind of conflict is nearly inevitable in cases where the Establishment clause
issue is resolved by the application of the test found in Zelman. Such cases
usually begin with the application of the tripartite test of impermissible
governmental involvement with sectarian institutions found in Lemon v.
Kurtzman,7 viz, that the governmental action must not be motivated by a desire
to aid sectarian institutions, must not have the primary effect of promoting
such institutions and must not foster excessive entanglement with sectarian
institutions. The test in Zelman relies upon the actions of a non-governmental,
private “chooser” to resolve the entanglement and primary effect prongs of the
Lemon test. Therefore, cases resolved by Zelman will concern choices by a
private chooser that result in a government benefit to a sectarian institution;
any inhibition or pressure on the free expression of the private chooser’s
religious preferences because of the nature of the choices the government

6

536 U.S. 639 (2002)

7

403 U.S. 602 (1971)
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makes available will then implicate the Free Exercise clause, creating the
nearly inevitable tension between the clauses.
In Locke the Establishment clause issue was resolved through the
application of Zelman and then the Free Exercise issue was approached as an
independent question of a condition on a benefit resolvable on a minimal
rationality basis. I will argue within that limiting conditions on the application
of the Zelman test should mean that such problems cannot be settled so easily
nor so compartmentally. Rather, the application of Zelman itself requires a
greater consideration of the burdening of the free exercise of religion than the
Locke court applied. 8
I. A. “Play” – The Problem as Presented in Locke v. Davey
In the Locke case, the “play” arose when a governmental disbursement
that benefited a religious educational institution, viz. the receipt of publicly
funded scholarship tuition funds for Joshua Davey’s education, passed muster
under the Establishment clause because of the intervention of a program of
private choice by a private individual (viz. the scholarship recipient) who
selected the school. Such sanitizing choices are a key determinant for the line

8

I suppose I am suggesting also that Locke v. Davey is wrongly decided but that, of

course, is water under the dam.
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of Establishment clause cases, in particular Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,9 that
found government disbursements to religious organizations via such choices
constitutional. Hereinafter such choice mechanisms will be termed “Zelman
choices” for convenience. Locke is an exemplar of this new generation of
Establishment clause cases that have written into law a safe harbor, private
choice, for governmental benefits that find their way into the coffers of
religious institutions in amounts that are neither incidental nor trivial.
The scholarship program in Locke had an important restriction – it
could not be used for study in the ministry,10 and this was the program and
profession that Davey wanted to enter. Consequently, in Locke the options
presented in the private choice arguably infringed upon Free Exercise rights -the dilemma that gives rise to the title of this article.
9

536 U.S. 639 (2002)

10

The relevant Washington statute phrased the prohibition as “no aid shall be awarded

to any student who is pursuing a degree in theology,” which the parties conceded
meant degrees that “devotional in nature or designed to induce religious faith.” Locke
at 1310. As Justice Thomas pointed out in his dissent to Locke, the study of theology
and preparation for the ministry are not necessarily the same thing. Locke at 1320-21.
The case is resolved by attributing the state’s administrative interpretation as applying
the prohibition only to preparation for the ministry and this assumption will also
inform this article.
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Over the vigorous dissent of Justice Scalia, the Locke Court’s analysis
of the permissibility of the condition on the benefit (the exclusion of ministry
studies) was based upon the argument that the government’s greater power to
create a benefit subsumed the lesser power to condition the benefit (the
“greater powers” argument).11 Justice Scalia would have employed a strictscrutiny equal protection test to the conditioned benefit, but I will argue that,
under either test, the analysis of the conditioned benefit should be modified to
take into account the presumptions that are incorporated in the “private choice”
safe harbor and that these presumptions “tighten up” the “play in the joints.”
In Locke Joshua Davey, the relevant individual chooser (for
Establishment clause purposes) in the Zelman choice, claimed that the
governmental limitations on his Zelman choice burdened his free exercise of
religion. It is here, I will say, where the “joint” of the metaphor is found – the
“play” point where movement in one clause will cause the rights and/or
privileges inherent in the other to bend. As Justice Scalia argued in frustration
in his Locke dissent, this “play” as a decision point seemed to him “not so

11

See text infra section II.C . For a full discussion of the “greater powers” doctrine see

Brooks Fudenberg, Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater Powers: A Separability
Approach, 43 U.C.L.A. L.REV 371 (1995)
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much a legal principle as a refusal to apply any principle when faced with
competing constitutional directives.”12
Locke was the second occasion that the U.S. Supreme Court had
locked horns with the recalcitrant Washington State refusing to permit students
to apply certain state scholarship funds to train in the ministry. In their prior
scuffle, Witters v. State Comm’n for the Blind,13 a recipient of a scholarship,
intended to help the blind train for a vocation, contested the same Washington
State limitation on the funding, that is, excluding training for the ministry. The
Supreme Court of Washington State justified the restriction under the federal
and the Washington State constitutions’ religion clauses.14

12

Locke at 1317 (Scalia dissenting)

13

474 U.S. 481 (1986)

14

The U.S. Constitution religion clauses read: “Congress shall make no law respecting

an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST.
AMEND.

I. The Washington State religion clauses are differently worded: “Religious

Freedom. Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief
and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be molested or
disturbed in person or property on account of religion; but the liberty of conscience
hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify
practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state. No public money or
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property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or
instruction or the support of any religious establishment.” WASH. CONST. ART. I § 11.
Another provision of the Washington Constitution, referring directly to
schools, was rejected by the Court as being inapplicable to the Locke case. That
section, stating “all schools maintained and supported wholly or in part by the public
funds shall be forever free from sectarian control or influence,” Wash. const. art. IX §
4, was challenged as a so-called “Blaine Amendment,” a product of nativist, antiCatholic sentiment of the late 19th century. James G. Blaine, a republican
congressman, led an unsuccessful attempt in 1876 to amend the federal constitution to
explicitly prohibit federal and state legislators from “permitting in any degree a union
of church and state, or granting any special privilege, immunity, or advantage to any
sect or religious body … or taxing the people of any state … for the support of any
sect or religious body… .” Further, the amendments would prevent lawmakers from
“levy[ing] any tax or mak[ing] any gift, grant, or appropriation, for the support, or in
aid of any church, religious sect, or denomination, or any school, seminary or
institution of learning , in which the faith or doctrines or any religious order or sect
shall be taught or inculcated… .” See Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and
State, 299 et seq. (2002). The federal amendment failed in the Senate but the effort
spawned a number of amendments to state constitutions. Id. The anti-catholic
rhetoric in the discussion of these amendments raised a challenge to their validity as
having an improper intent. The Locke court declined to join the issue, finding that the
arguable “Blaine Amendment” was not implicated, see Locke at 1314 n.7, leaving the
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The U.S. Supreme Court found no bar in the U.S. constitution’s
Establishment clause to the state singling out training for the ministry for
exclusion from the scholarship program.15 That said, the remaining question,
whether singling out the ministry as unfundable was an unconstitutional
impediment to the student’s exercise of religion,16 was answered in the
negative. Hence the struggle to give substance to the Court’s explanatory
metaphor of this result – that there is “play in the joints.”
B. Thesis in Brief
My discussion will focus on the implications of a governmental action
that presents a possible infirmity under the Establishment clause and impacts
upon a person’s exercise of religion. I will argue that where the Establishment
clause concern is vitiated by employing a valid Zelman choice, there are
implications

for

Free

Exercise

and

these

concern

the

degree

of

governmentally-created coercion in the choice for the chooser. This question
Blaine question for another day. For a discussion of the Blaine amendments, see F.
William O'Brien, The Blaine Amendment 1875-1876, 41 U. Det. L.J. 137 (1963).
15

See footnote 9, supra, discussing singling out the ministry is an interpretation of the

Washington State constitutional language.
16

The student also raised a free speech claim, disposed of perhaps too curtly by the

court. Locke at 1313 n.3.
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is an empirical one that should be resolved on the facts of the particular case.
First, then, the specifics of the Zelman choice will be analyzed.
II. Zelman Choices and Their Limitations
A. Zelman Choices Described
The distribution of government largesse to religious institutions to
advance their religious purposes is the essential bete noir of Establishment
clause jurisprudence. At the time of the ratification of the federal constitution
several states had had statutory requirements that funneled or coerced public
support to one state religion or to religions in general; the federal constitutional
ban clearly barred such activity by Congress.17

This bar later was read into

the limitations on actions by the states.18

17

Nine of the thirteen original colonies had established churches. At the time of the

adoption of the First Amendment only Massachusetts, New Hampshire and
Connecticut still retained them. See James E. Woods, Jr., THE FIRST FREEDOM 7
(1990). See also Leonard Levy, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 1 – 93 (1994).
18

See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-304 (1940); Everson v. Bd. of Education,

331 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1947)
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Schooling, particularly the non-elite education of the general
population, had historically been a task of religious organizations.19 As the
task of promoting popular education became increasingly taken over by secular
authorities as a duty of the state, the modern line of establishment
jurisprudence developed.20

This line limited the extent to which public

funding for popular education could be shared with the religious organizations
who shared the same task; the bulk of modern Establishment clause cases have
addressed religion in schools.21

19

For a comprehensive history of the development of popular education including the

involvement of religious organizations, see the seminal history by the famous early
progressive educator Elwood Cubberly, THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION (1948)
20

See Levy, supra, at 149.

21

Of the seminal cases on the Establishment clause, cases concerning public schooling

make up a lion’s share. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
(reimbursing parents for money spent on public transportation for children going to
and from schools including, private schools); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S.
203 (1948) (school board cannot offer religious classes in public schools); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prohibited school board’s official prayer); School Dist.
of Abington Township v. Schempp et al, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (no compelled Bible
reading in public school); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (invalidation of
statute forbidding evolution courses because of its conflict with Biblical account); Bd.
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Early cases used absolutist rhetoric about the “separation of church and
state,” even where the results of the cases seemed to back-pedal on the
strongly-voiced position.22

Language softened as justices seeking to

of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (statute requiring school districts to purchase
and loan textbooks to private school students upheld); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971) (A statute concerning a number of programs aiding parochial education
are invalidated using a three-part test which requires (1) government aid must have a
secular purpose; (2) its effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) the
state must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.); Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (statute allowing parents to deduct tuition, textbook, and
transportation expenses of their children upheld); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
(1997) (title I courses permitted to be taught in private religious schools); Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (statute providing government aid in materials and
equipment to public and private schools upheld); Zelman v. Simmons Harris, 536
U.S. 639 (2002) ( government funding for tuition to parochial schools upheld). Cf.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating a statute outlawing
parochial education on substantive due process grounds).
22

Some of the most quoted absolutist language on the Establishment clause is found

in Justice Black’s Everson opinion, such as “The First Amendment has erected a wall
between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not
approve the slightest breach.” 330 U.S. at 18.

26279-text.native.1126856032
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accommodate religious schools looked for leeway in the religion clauses,
particularly in funding and similar aid for parochial schools.23 This line of
cases sought to “break the link” (that implicates the Establishment clause)
between a governmental entity’s disbursement from the public fisc and a
recipient religious school.
Ultimately the desired break was accomplished by the mechanism of a
private citizen making an intervening choice as to the recipient institution.
This is at the crux of the Supreme Court decision Zelman v. Simmons-Harris24
that sanctioned a government program of vouchers for education redeemable at
parochial schools in Cleveland, Ohio. Under Zelman a link-breaking choice
must have the following features: 1) the government’s disbursement program
must have a legitimate secular purpose; 2) the enabling statute for the program
must be facially neutral in respect to religion; 3) the relevant chooser must be
acting as a private individual; and 4) the choice must be “independent and
genuine.”25

ultimately sided with the state in favor of the reimbursement of bus transportation
expenditures as constitutional.
23

See cases and discussion infra in section II.B.3.

24

536 U.S. 639

25

536 U.S. at 49
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1) Legitimate Governmental Purpose.

However tattered Lemon v.

Kurtzman26 may be, the “primary purpose” test, which requires a valid secular
purpose for the legislation, remains good law.

It also remains the least

challenging prong of the Lemon test, tending to elevate form over substance.
Very few governmental programs have been so unwary as to be impaled on
this prong.27
2) Facially neutral. The statute that provides for the benefit must be
“neutral in respect to religion,” favoring no particular sect or doctrine on its
face.28

Since a Zelman choice only arises when there is a possibility that

public funds will be disbursed to a religious entity, facial neutrality requires

26

403 U.S. 602 (1971)

27

See Edwards v. Aguilard, 382 U.S. 578 (1986). The Court found that the Louisiana

State requirement that public school instruction in evolution be “balanced” by
instruction in creation science had no other effective purpose than to introduce
religious content into the school curriculum, commenting that “while the Court is
normally deferential to a State's articulation of a secular purpose, it is required that the
statement of such purpose be sincere and not a sham.” Id. at 587. However, no
subsequent Supreme Court decision similarly found sham purposes in Establishment
cases.
28

536 U.S. at 652
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that “the program is made available generally without regard to the sectariannonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited.”29
3) Private Chooser. The program in question “provides assistance
directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to
religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent
private choice.”30

This condition addresses both the identity of the chooser

and the nature of the choice. The relevant chooser must be a private individual
as opposed to, say, a public employee acting as an agent of a governmental
body.
4) An Independent and Genuine Choice. Locke’s criteria for the choice
to be “genuine and independent” include that there is no coercion or skewing
of the choice toward religious institutions by the government program.31
There seems to be no similar requirement that the program not be skewed
towards the non-sectarian choices.32 The Court argues that the program at issue
“in fact creates financial disincentives for religious schools, with private

29

Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), cited and followed in Locke at 651.

30

536 U.S. at 652

31

536 U.S. at 653, 654

32

See Zelman at 653-54.
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schools receiving only half the government assistance given to community
schools and one-third the assistance given to magnet schools.” 33
At first blush one wonders how the choice can be “independent and
genuine” where there is no parity between the sectarian and public school
choice. Would this not mean that the chooser is being pushed towards the
community and magnet schools? However, this is not the coercion the Court
considered at issue; rather, it is the right in the chooser not to be coerced
unduly to participate in a religious institution. That is, the Free Exercise right
of the person to be free of religious compulsion was implicated.34

Left

unfulfilled and substantially unaddressed is the affirmative side of Free
Exercise -- a right in the chooser to choose in accord with religious preferences
without that choice being burdened.35

33
34

Id.
See, e.g., West Va. St. Bd of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)

(unconstitutional to punish children refusing on religious grounds to recite the Pledge
of Allegiance); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (unconstitutional to compel
students to participate in a non-denominational prayer); School Dist. V. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963) (unconstitutional to compel students to participate in Boble reading in
public schools).
35

Moreover, placing the religious institution in a disadvantaged position invites a Free

Exercise analysis as well on behalf of the religious institution. The Cleveland system
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B. Conforming the Zelman Choice to the Lemon Test
Although a citation to Lemon v. Kurtzman36 is conspicuous by its
absence from the majority opinion in Locke, unless and until it is explicitly
overruled it remains the summary of necessary conditions for the
constitutionality of governmental interactions with religious institutions that
raise a question of the establishment of religion.
Lemon’s disjunctive tripartite test itself is an attempt at a summary of
prior lines of religion clause jurisprudence that remain good law on their own:
(1) that the statute must have a secular purpose; (2) that the statute’s principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; nor
(3) can the statute foster an “excessive government entanglement with
religion.”37

in Zelman placed the religious private school in no more disadvantaged a position than
a secular private school, in the Court’s view yielding a facial neutrality. Zelman at
653-54.
36

403 U.S. 602 (1971)

37

Lemon at 612-13. Subsequent phrasings of the test have conflated part one with part

two, stating, for instance, that the government did not act with the purpose or primary
effect “of advancing or inhibiting religion.” Zelman at 649.

The rephrasing is not

identical in meaning to the language in Lemon since it suggests, for instance, that a
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The line of cases relied upon in Zelman rhetorically differ from earlier
cases such as Lemon. For convenience in explaining the difference I will label
the two approaches arguments based on prohibitions (“Ap”) and presumptions
of propriety (“Pp”); the reason for choosing these particular labels will become
clearer infra as the approaches are described in greater detail. The change in
rhetoric in the cases forming the foundation of Zelman also changed the nature
of the Establishment clause inquiry, rendering it more empirical and
consequently, it should also be more burdensome for the governmental party.
1. Arguments Based on Prohibitions
The structure of an argument based on prohibitions is one in which
definite prohibited actions or conditions are laid out, and then the action or
condition at issue is described and compared to the prohibited actions. If the
action or condition at issue contains a reasonable risk of crossing into the
prohibited ones, then that action is considered itself improper.
In Lemon, for example, the Court invalidated a salary supplement to
sectarian teachers by such an argument. The relevant prohibited condition is
the teaching of religion financed by public funds, that “government is to be
statute that intentionally inhibits a religious institution from its mission might be
constitutionally suspect under the Establishment clause as well as the Free Exercise
clause. Cf. Church of Lukumi-Babalu v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 510 (1993).
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entirely excluded from the area of religious instruction.”38 Despite testimony
by sectarian teachers that they would not be interjecting religion into their
publicly-financed teaching of secular subjects, and the trial court finding that
“religious values did not necessarily affect the content of the secular
instruction,”39 the Supreme Court considered the hazard intolerable:
We need not and do not assume that teachers in parochial
schools will be guilty of bad faith or any conscious design
to evade the limitations imposed by the statute and the First
Amendment. … With the best of intentions such a teacher
would find it hard to make a total separation between
secular teaching and religious doctrine.

…Further

difficulties are inherent in the combination of religious
discipline and the possibility of disagreement between
teacher and religious authorities over the meaning of the
statutory restrictions.
We do not assume however that parochial school teachers
will be unsuccessful in their attempts to segregate their
religious
38

Lemon at 625

39

Lemon at 618
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responsibilities.

But the potential for impermissible

fostering of religion is present.”40
Absent from the Court’s Ap approach is a willingness to wait and see if
the improper activity occurs, indeed, even if the probability is necessarily
likely. “Lines must be drawn,”41 states the Court and the logical possibility
weighed more heavily than an empirical approach. “Mere statistical judgment
will not suffice as a guarantee that state funds will not be used to finance
religious education.” 42
The great exemplar of the Ap approach is the opinion in Everson v.
Board of Education43 by Justice Black, who was never shy about drawing
absolutist lines in the sand: “No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither
a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the
affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of

40

Lemon at 619 (emphasis added)

41

Lemon at 625

42

Nyquist at 778

43

330 U.S. 1 (1947)
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Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to
erect 'a wall of separation between Church and State’.”44
We find similar statements in other Ap cases, e.g. Grand Rapids School
Dist. v. Ball45 ("Although the Establishment Clause jurisprudence is
characterized by few absolutes, the Clause does absolutely prohibit
government financed or government sponsored indoctrination into the beliefs
of a particular religious faith.") and Meek v. Pittenger,46 stating that the District
Court erred in relying entirely on "the good faith and professionalism of the
secular teachers and counselors," since the state must “be certain,… that . .
.personnel do not advance the religious mission of the church-related
schools."47
In sum, while the actions of individuals are culpable only if a statutory
line is crossed in fact, the governmental program is to be judged improper if it
opens a door wide enough to admit of a statutory violation easily committed,
whether likely or not.

2. Presumptions of Propriety
44

Everson at 16.

45

473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985)

46

421 U.S. 349 (1975)

47

421 U.S. at 370
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Justice O’Connor declared that the court had progressed beyond the Ap
approach in Agostini v. Felton, stating that “we have abandoned the
presumption erected in Meek and Ball that the placement of public employees
on parochial school grounds inevitably results in the impermissible effect of
state-sponsored indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic union between
government and religion” adding that “such a flat rule, smacking of antiquated
notions of ‘taint’ would indeed exalt form over substance.”48 Certainly some
change in the law must account for the difference in results between Aguilar
and Agostini since there was no change in the facts.49

48

Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 223 (1997) quoting Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in

Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1, 13 (1993).
49

Agostini was brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) requesting

relief from a final judgment, that is, the judgment in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402
(1985), because it is “no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application” if the petitioning party can show “a significant change in factual
conditions or in the law.” The court did not find that there were any significant
factual changes. Agostini at 216. Rather the case turned on an alleged change in the
law, citing, e.g. Zobrest and Witters. See the discussion infra section II.B.3.
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Justice O’Connor dates this explicit sea change in Establishment clause
law to Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District50 which, with its
predecessors Mueller v. Allen51 and Witters v. Washington Department of
Services for the Blind,52 form the precedential basis for the Zelman choice.
Zobrest concerned the provision of a sign language translator to a deaf student
at a parochial school pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act.53 Specifically repudiated is Justice Souter’s Ap-style explanation of the
result in Zobrest that attempts narrowly to categorize the translator task as one
that will not implicate the forbidden possibilities.

Rather, Justice O’Connor

specifically admits to the possibility that the translator, a government
employee, might have the opportunity to inculcate religion in the translating
activity and took Zobrest to mean: “that public employees will be not be
presumed to inculcate religion.” 54
What does Justice O’Connor mean by “presumption” and “presume” in
the language quoted above? Generally a presumption in the law is “any matter
50

509 U.S. 1 (1993)

51

463 U.S. 388 (1981)

52

474 U.S. 481 (1986)

53

20 U.S.C. §1400 et seq.

54

Id. See also discussion at section II.B.(3)(c) infra.
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of fact which is furnished to a legal tribunal otherwise than by reasoning, as the
basis of inference in ascertaining some other matter of fact.”55 Generally a
presumption effects evidentiary burdens at trial: a presumption can render
some factual situation as legally sufficient for a prima facie case or shift the
burden of production or persuasion to the party that does not receive the
benefit of the presumption.56
True presumptions are defeasible and can be rebutted. They are “the
bats of the law, flitting in the twilight but disappearing in the sunshine of actual
facts.”57 There are differing theories among evidentiary scholars as to how
much sunshine is required and exactly where the bats go when they disappear,
but that is beyond the scope of this article.58

Suffice it to say that a true

55

James B. Thayer, Presumptions and the Law of Evidence, 3 HARV. L. REV. 141, 143 (1889)

56

9 Wigmore, EVIDENCE § 2499 (1981)

57

Mackowik v. Kansas City, St. James & Council Bluffs RR, 196 Mo. 550, 570, 94

SW 256, 262 (1906).
58

A famous dispute arose between two preeminient scholars of evidence, James

Thayer and Edmund Morgan, on the effect of rebuttal upon a presumption.

One

view, attributed to Thayer, treated a presumption as “fix[ing] the duty of going
forward with proof,” and if rebutted the presumption was destroyed and no longer a
consideration in the case. See James Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on the Evidence
at the Common Law, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 313, 352 (1953). This effect of rebuttal on the
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evidentiary presumption is rebuttable, so presumptions – such as someone who
has disappeared and not been heard from in seven years is dead, that a letter
properly addressed and posted was delivered, that a thing which someone
possesses is owned by that person,59 or liability based upon res ipsa loquitur60
– can all be placed in doubt by competent evidence.
However, there is a second use of “presumption,” commonly called
“conclusive presumptions,” that is disowned by evidentiary scholars as having
“no place in the principles of evidence.”61 These are rules of substantive law
that, certain facts having been established, render a legal conclusion
unassailable by contrary factual showings.62

For instance, such “conclusive

presumption was characterized as the “bursting bubble” theory of presumptions. See
Edward W. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, I12
Stan. L. Rev. 5, 17-18 (1959). Morgan considered the Thayer theory to give too little
effect to presumptions and felt that the opponent of a presumption bore a burden both
of introducing evidence and of persuasion. See Edmund Morgan, Some Observations
Concerning Presumptions, 44 Harv. L.Rev 906, 927 (1931).
59

Wigmore EVIDENCE §2492

60

W. Prosser, LAW OF TORTS §§39, 40 (4th ed. 1971)

61

Wigmore, EVIDENCE §2492

62

“Wherever from one fact another is said to be conclusively presumed, in the sense

that the opponent is absolutely precluded from showing by any evidence that the
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presumptions” can be established by statute as where a worker’s compensation
statute requires, for the purpose of those proceedings, any widow(er) of a
covered decedent to be treated as having been wholly dependent on the
decedent.63
A third usage of “presumption” is the casual usage wherein the word is
simply synonymous with “assumption,” and is used to describe some
conclusion that a reasonable person would tend to draw given the particular
facts of a matter. 64
The Pp argument, as quoted in the language from Agostini, above,
introduces presumptions of regularity in governmental behavior as factors in

second fact does not exist, the rule is really providing that where the first fact is shown
to exist, the second fact’s existence is wholly immaterial for the purpose of the
proponent’s case; and to provide this is to make a rule of substantive law and not a
rule apportioning the burden of persuading as to certain propositions or varying the
duty of coming forward with evidence.” Wigmore, EVIDENCE § 2492
63

See Kenneth S. Broun, The Unfullfillable Promise of One Rule for All Presumptions,

62 N.C.L.REV 697,700 (1984), citing N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 97-39 (1979).
64

Cf. “The act of presuming or accepting as true. 3. Acceptance or belief based on

reasonable evidence; assumption or supposition. 4. A condition or basis for accepting
or presuming.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th
Edition. 2000)
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the entanglement and primary effect prongs of the Lemon test. What sort of
presumptions are these – true presumptions, “conclusive” presumptions or
mere assumptions? There can be only one answer to this. If they are mere
assumptions they would be common sense judgments founded in the particular
facts of a particular case somewhat like judicial notice of a fact, and could not
be the foundation of any generalizable legal rule. If they were “conclusive”
presumptions the Court would be presuming as a matter of law the precise
inquiry of the entanglement and effect prongs and thereby rendering them a
legal nullity. Therefore they must be ordinary legal presumptions, rebuttable
by facts.
So, in the treatment of the issue in Agostini and Zobrest, the Court
relied upon a presumption of regularity in the behavior of the public employees
in order to overcome Lemon’s effect and entanglement prongs. That the Apstyle arguments entail a presumption of misbehavior by governmental
employees seems to be a mischaracterization of the argument, since it is
sufficient for the Ap argument if there are insufficient or entangling safeguards
against the forbidden behavior whether it is likely or not that the public
employee will stray from properly executing his or her duty.
The use of such a presumption introduces a complication that the Ap
approach had been able to avoid. The Ap approach is entirely defeasible only
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by a showing that no realistic opportunity to misbehave is present. This is a
fairly high standard and the burden of persuading that no such possibility exists
is on the proponent of the disputed statute.

Empirical showings that the

employees in fact have not misbehaved are beside the point for the Ap
argument. Consequently the AP argument neither needs nor employs any true
presumption in respect to the public employees once it is established that there
is a real possibility of an insufficiently policable opportunity to misbehave.
This difference in rhetorical approach between Ap and Pp is marked in
the Court’s analyses of the effect and entanglement Lemon prongs. It is not a
new feature of the purpose prong because that test, with the notable exception
of Edwards v. Aguilard, nearly always reviews the language of statute facially
and lets the legislature enjoy a true presumption (of the first kind) of regularity.
The Pp approach carries over this tack into its analyses of the other Lemon
prongs.
The Pp argument should be vulnerable then to empirical data and
requires an investigation of the question: What circumstances justify the
presumption? To answer this question the precedent cases for the Pp approach
can be read to provide the conditions for establishing presumed regularity; that
is, the precedent cases for Zelman, discussed in the next section following, can
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provide guidance as to the substantive limits on when and under what
conditions such presumptions can obtain.
3. Interpreting the Zelman Precedents’ Limits on Presumptions
a. Zelman Presumptions and the Interplay of Lemon’s
Effect and Entanglement Prongs
To recap, the function of the presumptions of the Pp argument in a case
like Locke is to navigate the rocky relationship between the primary effect
prong of Lemon and the entanglement prong. In order to avoid the effect of an
act from impermissibly benefiting religious institutions where such a potential
exists there must be some sort of safeguard.

If those safeguards require an

intrusive policing of the religious institution by the state then the act will run
afoul of the entanglement prong of the Lemon test.
There are two ways to limit the potential of an impermissible act: to
presume certain acts will be sufficiently unlikely to occur as to reduce the
potential to de minimis level (the Pp approach); or to forbid the action entirely
or require the government to police the program (within the confines of the
entanglement concerns) to assure that the impermissible act will not occur (the
Ap approach).

The advantage of the Ap approach is that it does not run the

same risk of triggering the entanglement problems. The disadvantage is that to
be sound it should require a justification that can withstand facts and statistical
data and there should be an agreement as to what constitutes de minimis.
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Financial grants to religious schools have been found permissible when
they are carefully tailored to avoid financing religious functions, for instance,
in Tilton v. Richardson65 where federal construction grants for university
facilities were approved for church-related universities. The grants could not
be used for construction of “any facility used or to be used for sectarian
instruction or as a place for religious worship or … any facility which … is
used or to be used primarily in connection with any part of the program of a
school or department of divinity.”66 The Court also took into account that the
curriculum of the school was not so pervasively religious that the subjects
taught in the buildings would amount to religious instruction.67

65

66

403 U.S. 672 (1971)

403 U.S. at 675, quoting the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, 20 U.S.C.

§751(a)(2).
67

The opponents of the Act argued that a sectarian institution generally “imposes

religious restrictions on admissions, requires attendance at religious activities,
compels obedience to the doctrines and dogmas of the faith, requires instruction in
theology and doctrine, and does everything it can to propagate a particular religion.”
403 U.S. at 682. The Court acknowledged that some institutions had been found
ineligible for grants but pointed out that no such showing had been made for the
institutions at issue in Tilton. Id.
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The Tilton Court gave a four-part test for their analysis, adding to the
three prongs of Lemon a fourth condition that the statute not be found to inhibit
the free exercise of religion. In this case the fourth prong addressed a claim by
the complainants of a taxpayer injury because of the governmental grants to
the sectarian institutions. The Court dismissed the charge given that they were
not able “to identify any coercion directed at the practice or exercise of their
religious beliefs” and the tax burden would be no more significant than the
burdens approved in Walz.68 The Court did not consider whether there was any
burden on the religious institutions by the limits on their use of the facility.
Despite presenting the test as though it had four prongs, the Court handled the
Free Exercise claim as a separate inquiry, as do I in this article.
In any event, money from scholarships, as is the case with Locke, is not
earmarked and a sectarian institution would be able to apply those funds to any
of its functions. A direct, unrestricted grant by the government to a sectarian
institution would not pass Establishment clause muster like the narrowly
tailored and monitored grant in Tilton.69 Even if the there was a finding of an
appropriate secular purpose, such a grant would likely fail as having a primary
68

403 U.S. at 689

69

The grants in Tilton were monitored for 20 years and religious use of the buildings

so financed triggered penalties against the institution. 403 U.S. at 675. The Court
invalidated the limit of 20 years. 403 U.S. at 683-684.
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effect of advancing religion and/or engendering an extensive entanglement by
monitoring the use of general funds.
In the case Lynch v. Donnelly70(in which a public Christmas display by
a town was ruled constitutional) Justice O’Connor proposed an alternative test,
the “endorsement test,” for determining the constitutionality of the effects
covered in Lemon under the constitutional test for improper primary effect.71
70

465 U.S. 668 (1983)

71

See Lynch v Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 691-92 (1983):
Focusing on the evil of government endorsement or disapproval of
religion makes clear that the effect prong of the Lemon test is
properly interpreted not to require invalidation of a government
practice merely because it in fact causes, even as a primary effect,
advancement or inhibition of religion. The laws upheld in Walzv. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (tax exemption for religious,
educational, and charitable organizations), in McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961) (mandatory Sunday closing law), and in Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (released time from school for offcampus religious instruction), had such effects, but they did not
violate the Establishment Clause.

What is crucial is that a

government practice not have the effect of communicating a message
of government endorsement or disapproval of religion. It is only
practices having that effect, whether intentionally or unintentionally,
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Although it has not displaced Lemon it is not infrequently cited so in the
interest of thoroughness, I will include this consideration in the following
summaries.
First there is the Lemon/Lynch prohibition under the Establishment
clause in which the government may not give to a sectarian institution a grant
of money that is not limited in its uses to only secular activity:
Lemon/Lynch/Tilton
Government Grant -------------Limit: Cannot -----------------> Religious Institution
support, burden or
endorse religion

Second, there is the Zelman approach to an unconditional government
grant:

Zelman
Government Grant ------------>Private Chooser-------------------- > Religious Institution
(supported by presumptions
of regularity)

that make religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in
the political community.
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Obviously the private chooser must fulfill the functions represented by
the “limits” in the Lemon/Lynch/Tilton model. The foundational cases for the
Zelman choice are Mueller, Zobrest and Witters. In each of these cases the
impermissible acts, the presumptions about the actors and the standard for de
minimis effect should be examined to ascertain what are the standards for Pp
presumptions.
b) Mueller v. Allen
At issue in Mueller was a Minnesota statute that allowed state
taxpayers to deduct from their income taxes expenses incurred in providing
tuition, textbooks and transportation for their school-aged children.

Some

exemptions under the statute would have been permissible even as
expenditures directly by the state such as provision of secular textbooks
directly to students under Board of Education v. Allen,72 and transportation
under Everson v. Board of Education.

73

However, as of the time of Mueller

no direct payment to religious schools had been found to be constitutional so if
the deductions were the functional equivalent of such prohibited payments the
tax scheme would appear to be unconstitutional.
72

393 U.S. 236 (1968)

73

330 U.S. 1 (1947)
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The prohibited act would be an improper expenditure by the state in aid
of parochial schools, especially to the extent that it can be perceived as a stamp
of approval (or “imprimatur”) of sectarian schools; the relevant presumption is
that the state’s method of distributing the benefit could not achieve such an
effect except in an insignificant and incidental way, through distributing a
general benefit through tax deductions available to all parents whether their
children are in public or private schools, and whether their private school is
sectarian or not. “[Neutrally provided] state assistance to a broad spectrum of
citizens is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment clause.”74
Hence, the unwieldiness of the tax deduction mechanism of distributing
aid as a vehicle for government preferences for sectarian projects leads to a
presumption that the government, reduced to policing only in its usual and
unobtrusive activity of evaluating deductions listed on tax forms, is neither
engaged in an activity with a prohibited degree of advancing religion nor
entangling itself in it. Deciding that the tax-mechanism does not easily permit
the government to manipulate private actors to do what the government cannot
do directly, the area of activity sanitized by the presumption leaves a small
area to be controlled by policing.

74

Mueller at 398
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The rebuttal of the presumption would be to show that the mechanism
is rife with the high probability of just such a manipulation. In the dissents just
such a rebuttal is undertaken pointing out that the deduction required that the
parent have spent an amount in excess of $700 and those parents who send
their children to public school “are simply ineligible to obtain the full benefit
of the deduction except in the unlikely event that they buy $700 worth of
pencils, notebooks, and bus rides for their school-age children.” 75
The Court, in passing, notes that empirical evidence of special benefits
to religions “might be relevant to analysis under the Establishment Clause,”76
insofar as they are probative of demonstrating that the questioned program is
productive of “the evils against which the Establishment Clause was designed
to protect.”77 “What is at stake as a matter of policy,” reminds the Court, “is
preventing the kind and degree of government involvement in religious life
that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and frequently strain a
political system to the breaking point.”78 The Court reflects that “at this point
in the 20th century we are quite far removed from the dangers” the framers of
75

Mueller at 409

76

Mueller at 397 n.7

77

Mueller at 399

78

Mueller at 400
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the Constitution had in view in the late 18th century, presumably meaning the
acts of various states that sponsored specific religious institutions.79
79

Mueller at 400. Nevertheless, in the matter of parochial schools, a digression giving

some history may be instructive.

In the early 19th century we find religious

institutions very actively engaged in providing popular schooling and the City of New
York was eager to encourage the practice. Schools were one method of serving one’s
flock while recruiting new adherents for various churches. Unfortunately, the poorer
element of New York was not at the top of the churches’ list for recruitment, leaving
the area short of schools. Jail often became regarded by the young in these districts as
their trade school and New York’s city fathers were deeply concerned about the trades
to be learned there. In addition to common thievery, the proliferation of child
prostitution was of great concern. See Carl Kaestle, EVOLUTION OF AN URBAN
SCHOOL SYSTEM (1972) at 112-120. The historical novel The Alienist by Caleb Carr
was not merely being lurid with its plot centered on a child prostitution ring; it was
also narrating phenomenon of 19th century New York that was not as uncommon as
one might hope.
It happened that the religious commitments of the Society of Friends included
moral precepts that both valued public service and specifically deplored proselytizing.
Because they were not seeking to recruit, the Quakers readily embraced the task of the
education of the poor without regard to their students’ religion nor with the intention
of confronting or changing it, therefore they were even more eager than most to step
into a perceived underserved educational task. This is certainly not to say that other

26279-text.native.1126856032

Page 39 of 75

S. Keller, Rules of the Game
DO NOT CITE OR CIRCULATE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF AUTHOR

religions did not form any schools for the poor. There were and still are admirable
religious groups engaged in ministry to the poor through education but the Free
School Movement in New York City had its genesis in the Society of Friends.
Having stepped into a perceived social vacuum of substantial concern to the
city fathers, New York City gratefully provided a great deal of public support for the
Free School Movement. The congruence of the Quakers non-sectarian approach to
education and the government’s interest in remaining neutral in respect to religion
created a circumstance wherein the Quakers became a preferred provider because of
their particular articles of faith. The Quakers in their turn zealously guarded the
grants of public funds that enabled them to work with the poor and they became
vocally involved in the competition with other sectarian schools for public support.
Jealousy and enmity between religious providers ensued. Eventually the City of New
York took over the Free Schools which became the nucleus of their public system of
schools. See Kaestle at 159-164. And see generally Elwood P. Cubberly, History of
Education (1922).

My point is that the possibility of real establishment problems are not
as far behind us as the Supreme Court might wish. In countries with no
comparable barriers to state support for religious projects we see intimations of
what can happen when religious institutions become too dependent on the
public fisc. In the 1990’s the coalition government of Ehud Barack received
its deathblow when it attempted to change the regulation and funding of
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c) Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District
In Zobrest a deaf child attending a Roman Catholic high school in
Tucson, Arizona challenged a refusal by the school district to provide to him a
sign-language interpreter pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (“IDEA”).80

The school district denied the request based on

their understanding of the Establishment Clause, reasoning that “the interpreter
would act as a conduit for the religious inculcation of [the student].” 81
Both parties conceded that the IDEA was secular and neutral on its face
with no impermissible legislative intent; the effect and entanglement prongs of
Lemon were the issue. The circumstances of the case suggested three possible
prohibited scenarios: (1) a public employee paid to engage in the religious

schools in which the sect/political party Shas was heavily invested. See Joshua
Brilliant, Government to Abolish Religious Affairs Ministry, United Press
International (Sept. 3, 2000).Of course the United States is not a parliamentary
system, but that is mostly irrelevant to the point. Certainly the United States
has organized sectarian political interest groups with a marked influence on
American politics.
80

20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.

81

Zobrest at 5
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indoctrination of the student;82 (2) a public employee will be engaged in an
activity that is perceived as a governmental endorsement of a religious
message; and (3) a governmental benefit or payment will accrue to the benefit
of a sectarian institution, aiding it in its religious mission.
The Court’s answer to (1) and (2) is a presumption that the interpreter’s
actions will constitute nothing more than being a mere, virtually mechanical,
conduit, adding no increase, emphasis or elaboration of the proselytizing
message:
Nothing in this record suggests that a sign-language
interpreter would do more than accurately interpret
whatever material is presented to the class as a whole. In
fact, ethical guidelines require interpreters to ‘transmit
everything that is said in exactly the same way it was
intended.’ [The student’s] parents have chosen of their
own free will to place him in a pervasively sectarian
environment.

82

The sign-language interpreter they have

Unlike institutions of higher education, elementary and secondary parochial schools

are presumed to be unable to separate their religious mission from their educational
mission. Consequently having the interpreter interpret only for secular subjects would
not be a solution for this alleged Establishment Clause violation.
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requested will neither add to nor subtract from that
environment and hence the provision of such assistance is
83

not barred by the Establishment Clause.

The Court suggests that this same transparency, coupled with the fact
that the public employee is present only at the parent’s behest, should be
sufficient to deal with the appearance of endorsement. 84
The presumption reduces the entanglement by assuming it adequate
that the state need not police to ensure that no impropriety occurs, but rather
only to do little more than act if one does occur and is brought by chance to the
attention of a relevant authority. A similar presumption, a little more subtle,
underlies the Court’s treatment of (3):
[U]nder the IDEA, no funds traceable to the government
ever find their way into sectarian school’s coffers. The
indirect economic benefit a sectarian school might receive
by dint of the IDEA is the handicapped child’s tuition – and
that is, of course, assuming that the school makes a profit
on each student; that without an IDEA interpreter, the child

83

Zobrest at 13

84

Zobrest at 11
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would have gone to school elsewhere; and that the school,
85

then, would have been unable to fill that child’s spot.

Under this description the economic advantage to the school is
incidental and “attenuated.” This evaluation is true although only to the extent
that the small number of possible IDEA candidate students make the market
advantage to the school of the additional personnel virtually nil. For instance,
that presumption should fail for a sectarian school that marketed itself as
especially desirable to special needs children and it intended to substantially
rely upon public employees funded through the IDEA to provide services
necessary for those children. Note that under this Pp approach the rather real
possibility that sectarian schools might suffer a market disadvantage by being
ineligible for IDEA is of no consequence.
d. Witters v. Washington Dep’t of Services for the Blind
Witters has essentially the same facts as Locke v. Davey. A blind
student wished to apply his Washington State scholarship to training for the
ministry, which the Washington State statute prohibited.

This case is

remarkable among the cases in this section both for the fact that it is the only
opinion that was not authored by Justice Rehnquist and for the, no doubt

85

Zobrest at 10-11
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related, fact that the Witters decision, as authored by Justice Marshall, is not a
Pp but an Ap argument.
Justice Marshall disposed of the troublesome Lemon effect and
entanglement prongs by finding that the expenditure of the scholarship funds
was not properly attributable to the state, drawing on, inter alia, an
unconvincing comparison to a state employee using his salary check to support
his church.86
No doubt Witters is found in this list of precedents because of the
language of the separate concurrences by Justices Powell and O’Connor in
which Justice Rehnquist joined. These opinions cast the result as an extension
of Mueller (not cited in the Marshall opinion) and the scholarship in Witters
was deemed constitutional because the “benefit to religion resulted from the
numerous private choices of individual[s].” Thus recast, the argument rested
upon the Pp assumptions about the sanitizing effect of private choice,
condemning the Ap approach of the Washington Supreme Court wherein the
scholarship was invalidated because it “had the practical effect of aiding
religion in this particular case.”87 The concurring Justices preferred to “look

86

Witters at 486-487

87

Witters at 492 (emphasis in the original)
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at the nature and consequences of the program viewed as a whole.”88 But, of
course, that is the whole difference between the Ap and Pp approaches.
For the Ap approach a single counter-example is sufficient to
invalidate. The Pp approaches sweeps the relevant actions together with a
broad brush and attributes what it deems the likely action to all the actors as
their presumed course.

Then, for the purposes of Establishment Clause

jurisprudence, that presumed action is the only action that needs to withstand
the tests of the Establishment Clause.
e. A Summary of the Use of Presumptions in the
Zelman Precedents.
Some “choices” are shams, for instance the mugger’s “your money or
your life.”89 No meaningful choice was presented and the law refuses to treat

88

89

Id. (emphasis in the original)
This, I think, is the general view. There are those who argue that the mugger’s

proposition is a real choice. Richard Posner has taken the position that both the victim
and the mugger are exercising “free will” as the victim willingly makes the choice to
pay the mugger for his forebearance. See Richard Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 101 (1986).

Such a position may be reasonable in an abstract argument about

market behavior, but, given that the ultimate concern in evaluating choice in the
context of Zelman choices is that the choice be “independent and genuine” I believe
that even Judge Posner would not characterize this choice in that way.
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actions taken pursuant to the coercion inherent in the sham choice as freelymade choices. Nevertheless, in many choices daily our options are slim; no
grocery store will bargain with you over the cost of their goods – the sale price
is the only choice, take it or leave it.

Most of our contractual lives are

occupied by contracts of adhesion; our democratic institutions may offer us
only two choices for our leaders and our options generally are limited by time,
location, status, income or gender, not to mention luck.
Similarly the choices of those faced with Zelman choices may be
serendipitously limited by conditions unrelated to the statutory scheme. If the
blind student in Locke v. Davey had a personal fortune, or if he had qualified
for other scholarships without the limitations of the Washington grant, the
decision to take the Washington grant and forgo training for the ministry
certainly could not be characterized as a pressured one. The validity of the
statutory scheme cannot be expected to rise or fall on the accidental features of
the various citizens who may be affected by it.90 Nevertheless, given that one
90

Some accidental features, of course, may call the statutory scheme into question in

special circumstances, e.g. race, gender etc. Wealth discrimination however has not
been found to trigger any heightened scrutiny and will not alone impugn the
governmental program. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1972) ( In refusing to extend strict scrutiny to a statutory program
that disadvantaged the school districts of the poorer citizens the Court commented that
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of the stated necessary conditions for a valid Zelman choice is that the choice
be “independent and genuine”91 it must be asked “independent of what?”
At the crux of the precedential cases for Zelman are presumptions and
these presumptions concern the behavior of the government actors – that they
will not abuse their positions, that their actions will be proper.

The

presumptions are not based upon a carefully researched inquiry into what the
government is likely to do or even able to do but on the propriety of the tasks
the statutory scheme places upon the governmental actors only when they
perform their duties correctly. The presumptions did not begin and end with
the actions of employees like the Zobrest translator. There is the presumption,
as in Mueller, that the statutory scheme is properly formed in such a way that

“the class it defines have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not
saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process).

91

Zelman at 652, Locke at 1311. And see text supra at section II.A.
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the government engaged in employing it would be acting only in an
appropriate way for appropriate ends.92
An assumption such as this is found in Zelman itself, wherein the
majority that found that the Ohio vouchers distributed to parents for use in
private schools did not have the primary effect of supporting religion. Justice
Souter countered that the vast majority of private schools (82%) participating
in the program were parochial and received 96% of the voucher funds.93 How
could that not constitute a primary effect of aiding religion? How can it be
reconciled with Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist,94that found much smaller allocations to parochial schools via tax
credits for parents had impermissible effect?
Justice Rehnquist in reply pointed out that the proportion matched the
percentage generally of parochial to private schools in the city,95 adding that
the matter was of no relevance since the proportion of participating schools did
92

The inquiry under Ap would be if there is a real risk that the program is capable of

misuse, that is, the inquiry is not limited to how things would turn out if everything
went exactly according to plan.
93

Zelman at 703 (Souter dissenting)

94

43 U.S. 756 (1973)

95

Zelman at

26279-text.native.1126856032

Page 49 of 75

S. Keller, Rules of the Game
DO NOT CITE OR CIRCULATE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF AUTHOR

not reflect any activity by the government but simply an incidental fact about
the demographics: “to attribute constitutional significance to this figure,
moreover, would lead to the absurd result that a neutral school-choice program
might be permissible in some parts of Ohio, such as Columbus, where a lower
percentage of private schools are religious schools … but not in inner-city
Cleveland … where the preponderance of religious schools happens to be
greater.”96
That is, as long as the government was taking the school situation as it
found it and did nothing to create the situation, it was acting neutrally and
within the strictures of the Establishment Clause. As for Nyquist, the fatal flaw
there was that the function of the program in question “was unmistakably to
provide desired financial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions”97
because public schools were not able to participate in the program. That is to
say, the government’s program by design was to create a skew in the benefits
towards the parochial schools. If Cleveland’s design of its programs was
shown to create and exploit a skew in the benefits towards religious institutions

96

Zelman at 657

97

Zelman at 661 (emphasis in the original). Although this language suggests that the

purpose prong of Lemon was offended, the program in Nyquist failed for offending the
primary effects prong. See Nyquist at 780, 783.
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then it would seem then that under Justice Rehnquist’s reasoning Cleveland’s
program would fail under the Nyquist precedent.
Therefore, whatever else “independent and genuine” means for Zelman
choices, it must mean that the chooser must be free from actions prescribed in
the governmental program that, even when working exactly as intended, skew
or distort the chooser’s choice.
C. The Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions
and Zelman Choices
Zelman choices concern governmentally distributed benefits, and the
conditions on the receipt of benefit schemes can run afoul of the constitution.
Stated simply the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that “the
government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary
surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that
benefit altogether.”98 The doctrine appeals to basic sensibilities about justice
– that rights under the Constitution should not be destroyed or alienated by the
state either directly, by lop-sided bargains or by stealth. Yet this doctrine is a
troubled one in that there is widespread disagreement about the meaning and
application of this rule and, indeed, as shall be seen, even of its rationale.
98

Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1415

(1989).
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For the purposes of this discussion of Zelman choices, I submit that the
qualifications on the choices that sanitize government schemes touching on
establishment of religion under Zelman, viz. that the choice must be
“independent and genuine,” imposes even more stringent limits on permissible
Zelman choice schemes than the garden-variety doctrine of “unconstitutional
conditions,” particularly as it was applied by the Locke court.
Obviously it is tautological to say that a scheme must be invalidated if
it entails unconstitutional conditions. However, as I will argue, “independent
and genuine,” not being a necessary factor in testing for unconstitutionality of
conditions, should be treated as an additional factor in assessing the
constitutionality of Zelman choices, viz., the Establishment clause inquiry.
That is, that even a “very-close-to-unconstitutional” condition should be
enough to defeat the Zelman choice’s sanitizing effect since the standard
“independent and genuine” can be violated by acts that fall short of outright
unconstitutionality.
Put another way, the Zelman choice sanitizes just because the
government surrendered control of the distribution of the benefit to private
hands so completely that the government can no longer be viewed as the
benefactor nor the endorser of the ultimate, recipient religious institution. If
the independence of the private chooser is too compromised by the government
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then the government has not surrendered control in a way that takes away the
appearance of an endorsement and the primary effect of benefiting religion.
1. Analyzing Conditioned Benefits
Conditioned benefits are common but troublesome cases and the courts,
to be sure, have not shown much consistency in describing which kind are
permissible and which kind are not. Difficult to reconcile paradoxes abound,
for instance, conditions upon the editorializing of public broadcasters,99 or the
advertising by casinos100 that burdened freedom of speech were found
constitutionally impermissible while burdens upon the speech of family
planning counselors101 and limitations on certain tax-exempt organizations to
engage in political activity102 were not found to be unconstitutional conditions.
One problem in analyzing the permissibility of conditioned benefits is
that their analyses summon dueling characterizations: four approaches to the
analyses of possible unconstitutional conditions will be described in more
detail below. They are: (1) the conditions are merely a refusal by the state to

99

FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984)

100

Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328

(1986)
101

Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)

102

Regan v. Taxation Without Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983)
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subsidize an activity; (2) the conditions are inappropriately exacting a penalty
of the actor for making the choice; (3) by accepting the state’s choice the actor
is waiving a right; (4) the state’s creation of the choice is improper when
viewed systemically.
Refusal to subsidize / Exacting a penalty. One way to characterize the
benefit in Locke could be as a statutorily conditioned benefit where the state,
under no obligation to create scholarship benefits at all, is permitted to create a
scholarship program which limits itself to something less than the broadest
availability that the constitution will permit. The majority in the Locke case
argued that refusing a scholarship for Joshua Davey was simply a
governmental refusal to subsidize his particular whim to become a minister,
while for the Locke dissenters the government was exacting a penalty on
Davey, forcing him to lose a free exercise right to follow a religious calling.
The characterization of a conditioned benefit -- as a mere refusal to
subsidize as opposed to a penalty -- is truly a glass-is-half-full or half-empty
debate. Justice Rehnquist held that “the state has merely chosen not to fund a
distinct category of instruction” under the scholarship program applicable to
Joshua Davey, and “it does not require students to chose between their
religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit.”103

103

Locke at 1312
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Justice Scalia, “When the State makes a public benefit generally available, that
benefit becomes part of the baseline against which burdens on religion are
measured; and when the State withholds that benefit from some individuals
solely on the basis of religion, it violates the Free Exercise Clause no less than
if it had imposed a special tax.”104 What is at stake is whether the condition on
the benefit will trigger strict scrutiny. If the burden and “baseline” is as Justice
Scalia describes it, the condition will have to endure a separate, rigorous and
probably fatal strict scrutiny test,105 while the review of the majority ends with
the facial neutrality of the statute where the court “cannot conclude that the
denial of funding for vocational religious instruction is inherently

104

Locke at 1316

105

Once finding the condition subject to strict scrutiny Justice Scalia would extend the

rule of Church of Lukumi Babalu Ave. Inc v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 510 (1993) to these
facts:
If a state deprives a citizen of trial by jury or passes an ex post facto law, we
do not pause to investigate whether it was actually trying to accomplish the
evil the Constitution prohibits. It is sufficient that the citizen’s rights have
been infringed. It does not matter that a legislature consists entirely of the
purehearted, if the law it enacts in fact singles out a religious practice for
special burdens. (In part quoting Lukumi at 559)
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constitutionally suspect.

Without a presumption of unconstitutionality,

Davey’s claim must fail.”106
The majority, in supporting the state’s right to limit the scholarship,
appealed to an often-cited underlying rationale for conditioned benefits: that
the greater power of the state to refrain entirely from granting a benefit entails
a lesser power to limit the benefit. The “greater powers” argument has a long
history107 in American jurisprudence but not a clear one, despite its misleading
patina of self-evidence.

At one point Justice Brennan, despite having

employed the doctrine himself just a few years before,108 dismissed it as a

106

Locke at 1315

107

The first mention of the doctrine in a Supreme Court case can be found in Justice

McLean’s concurrence in Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 504 (1841), but
there are earlier references in Supreme Court literature. For a more comprehensive
history of the doctrine see Fudenberg at 375 n.17 and references cited therein.
108

Justice Brennan called the doctrine “discredited” in City of Lakewood v. Plain

Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 763 n.8 (1988) but in Northern Pipeline Constr.
Co, v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67 n.18 (1982) he argued that Congress’
“power to create legislative courts to adjudicate public rights carries with it the lesser
power to create administrative agencies for the same purpose.” See also Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825. 842 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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“discredited doctrine” – which the Court proceeded to apply again in the same
year.109
Both Justices Scalia110 and Rehnquist have appealed to the doctrine,
although Justice Rehnquist, in addition to being the author of Locke and
primary author of the Zelman line of cases, has been, more than any other
justice, the one who took up the mantle as its foremost advocate111 from Justice
O.W. Holmes, who famously articulated the strong greater/lesser powers
position first when he was a state judge in the cases of Commonwealth v.
Davis112 and McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford,113 the latter case best known

109

See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492

U.S. 408, 433 (1989)
110

111

Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825.
Justice Rehnquist authored seminal cases concerning conditioned rights, notably

Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) which upheld the receipt of federal family
planning funds conditioned upon an agreement to refrain from abortion counseling.
See also John R. Hand, Note, Buying Fertility: the Constitutionality of Welfare
Bonuses for Welfare Mothers Who Submit to Norplant Insertion, 46 Vand. L. Rev.
715, 739-440 (1993) (examination of Rehnquist’s position in 29 unconstitutional
conditions cases).
112

39 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1895), aff’d, Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897)

113

20 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892)
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for the oft-quoted “[A policeman] may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.” That is to say,
the greater power of the state to create the employment included the lesser
power to make conditions on the employment.

Justice Rehnquist reiterated

that position in Arnett v. Kennedy,114 where a public employee whistle-blower
challenged his discharge and the procedures that governed it, since his pretermination appeal rights were to appeal to the supervisor that he had exposed.
In finding that the statutory procedures were constitutional despite their
dissonance with the due process expectation of an unbiased decisionmaker
Justice Rehnquist argued “where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably
intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in
determining that right, a litigant in the position of the appellee must take the
bitter with the sweet.”115
Similarly Justice Rehnquist in Locke would have it that Joshua Locke
must accept the “sweet” of the scholarship with the bitterness of having one of
his possible educational and professional goals frustrated.

However, Arnett

itself was explicitly overruled in Cleveland Board of Education v.

114

416 U.S. 134 (1974)

115

416 U.S. at 152-154
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Loudermill,116 the Court’s majority expressly rejecting the application of this
“bitter with the sweet” approach in the context of due process procedures for
benefit terminations.117 While Loudermill may have made some clarifications
in the law about procedural due process, it was by no means a death knell for
the greater/lesser powers argument.

Applying greater/lesser powers

arguments, Justice Rehnquist won over the majority in Rust v. Sullivan,118
upholding the government’s right to condition family planning funds on a “gag
rule” for the discussion of abortion, and, more recently, rejected an
“unconstitutional conditions” challenge in U.S. v. American Library Assoc.
Inc.,119 to the Children’s Internet Protection Act120 which conditions library
subsidies on their filtering internet content, stating that “within broad limits
116

470 U.S. 532 (1985)

117

The Court held:
In light of these holdings, it is settled that the “bitter with the sweet” approach
misconceives the constitutional guarantee. If a clearer holding is needed we
provide it today. …While the legislature may elect not to confer a property
interest in [public] employment, it may not constitutionally authorize the
deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate
procedural safeguards. 470 U.S. at 541.

118

500 U.S. 173 (1991)

119

539 U.S. 194 (2003)

120

114 Stat. 2763A-335
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when the Government appropriates public funds to establish a program it is
entitled to define the limits of that program.”121
Waiver. Waiver suggests something deliberately and freely entered
into as part of a bargain. It smacks of something unsavory when the rights
granted to citizens to protect them from overbearing governmental interference
are overcome by the government’s unequal bargaining power.
Where an individual chooser who has been offered a “Hobson’s
choice” to surrender some right or privilege to obtain another the coerciveness
and quality of the choice offered is an important element. In most ethical
analyses, certainly those of a deontological bent, coercion is an assault upon
the autonomy of an individual with two elements usually presented as
necessary conditions: (1) a significant degree or kind of compulsion, and (2) an
intention on the part of the one compelling to control the other’s action.122
Coercion in its pejorative sense means the compulsion and the intention
are wrongful in degree or kind and is often discussed in conjunction with legal

121

122

539 U.S. at 211
See, e.g., Peter Westen, “Freedom and Coercion” – Virtue Words and Vice

Words, 1985 Duke law Journal 541, 589 (defined as a constraint knowingly brought to
bear on another to act in a way that that will leave the other worse off)
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standards for duress.123 Yet wrongfulness admits of degrees. Most would
agree that a choice is wrongfully coerced if made under a threat of torture or
wrongful incarceration, or if the government’s intention were of the sort that
would be invalidated under the intent prong of the Lemon test. Unfortunately
Locke v. Davey presents no such easy case – wrongfulness of the deprivation
of the scholarship is neither entirely self-evident nor indisputable.
Moreover, most choices in day-to-day living are constrained – one must
cross the street only where there is a crosswalk; one gets potato soup because
the store does not stock vichyssoise; one attends law school part-time because
one cannot afford to go full-time; one is constrained by the Justice Department
from acquiring one’s competitor. Indeed, coercion is considered a hallmark of
the state, even a sine qua non for state power; that being so, the mere fact the
government is behaving coercively cannot be sufficient for resolving the
question of whether the waiver is proper. Something more is needed to show
why a waiver should be deemed invalid.124

123

Cf. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Consent, Coercion, and Hard Choices, 67 Va L. Rev. 79, 88
(1981)

124

See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights

in a Positive State, 132 U.PA. L.REV 1293, 1295 (1984):
[M]uch constitutional thinking centered on limiting the use of
coercive force or criminal sanctions through which government has
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Some commentators add that the waiver suggests that rights are up for
sale, an undesirable commodification of those rights that were intended to act
as a check on governmental powers and therefore, arguably, should be
inalienable.

125

There is some support in case law that the forcing of a waiver

traditionally exerted its authority to deter undesirable conduct.
However, the conception of negative rights as freedom from coercive
violence has questionable value in shaping constitutional restraints on
a government that more often exerts its power by withholding
benefits than by threatening bodily harm. …Increasingly visible
governmental actions substantially impinge on individual lives
without invoking the threat of mayhem or incarceration. The greatest
force of modern government lies in its power to regulate access to
scarce resources.”
125

See, e.g. Kreimer at 1387-93:
The case for recognition of waivers rests on the
conviction that constitutional rights protect individual
choice. But many constitutional rights protect other
values or protect individual choice only as a means to
the realization of other ends. For such rights, there is
no paradox in asserting that the choice of the
individual should not decide the applicability of the
right in question. …To the extent that a right is the
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is an improper coercion by the government in, for example, U.S. v. Butler126
and its progeny. Butlerinvalidated a state requirement that foreign
corporations waive their right to bring cases in federal court as a condition of
doing business in the states; the subsequent application of the arguments found
in Butler have been erratic.127

result of a definition of the structure and power of
government, an individual decision to waive it is
irrelevant.

See also Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972);
Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 478
(1981). For a more sympathetic view of a market in rights see Richard A. Epstein,
Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 5 (1988).
126

297 U.S. 1 (1936). See also Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529, 532 (1922)

(State cannot force waiver of right to resort to federal courts as a condition for doing
business in the state).
127

Shortly after deciding Butler the Court declined to apply it in Steward Mach. Co v.

Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (decided on other grounds) wherein a claim was made that
the Social Security Act of 1935 unconstitutionally conditioned funds upon the state’s
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Systemic impropriety.

Other analyses of conditioned benefits, in

particular, those of Kathleen Sullivan, have focused upon the systemic effect of
conditioned benefits:
[Such conditions] implicate the boundary between the public and
private realms, which government can shift through the allocation of
benefits as readily as through the use or threat of force.

… [T]hey

permit circumvention of existing constitutional restraints on direct
regulation.

The second distributive concern of unconstitutional

conditions doctrine is the maintenance of government neutrality or
evenhandedness among rightholders. The third is the prevention of
constitutional caste: discrimination among rightholders who would
otherwise make the same constitutional choice, on the basis of their
relative dependency on government benefit.128
Under this systemic approach the court would “subject to strict review any
government benefit condition whose primary purpose or effect is to pressure
recipients to alter a choice about exercise of a preferred constitutional liberty

passage of unemployment compensation legislation.
specifically overruled.
128

Sullivan at 421
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or a direction favored by government.”129 Her analysis argued that the
constitutional limitations on government encroachment on guaranteed liberties
regulates relationships between government and rightsholders and between
classes of rightsholders.130 She divided the latter category into horizontal
relationships (rightsholders for whom the tradeoff is not unacceptable or is no
sacrifice as opposed to those for whom it is) and vertical (rightholders who
differ, for instance, by economic class in their ability to resist the tradeoff of
rights), which Professor Sullivan termed “Constitutional caste.” This systemic
approach would require strict scrutiny of any conditioned governmental benefit
that substantially impinged upon the “distributive concerns” enumerated in the
quote above.
What is important about all of these approaches and particularly the
systemic approach is that, no matter whether a question of conditioned benefits
will pass muster under the Free Exercise clause, when it must do so in
combination with a Zelman-based Establishment clause defense, the question
of coercion, regularity of governmental actors and propriety of governmental
behavior goes to the heart of the presumptions that justify the treatment of the
Establishment clause question under Zelman.
2. Zelman Choices as “Unconstitutional Conditions Lite”
129

Sullivan at 1499

130

Sullivan at 1491.
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An “unconstitutional conditions” inquiry begins with an invasion of the
rights of an individual chooser who has been offered a “Hobson’s choice” to
surrender some right or privilege to obtain another and the coerciveness and
quality of the choice offered is an important element. While coercion often is
applied as a lynchpin in many Free Exercise decisions, intuitive because it
goes to the sense of injustice in the burden on religious freedom, I believe
coercion is less relevant in respect to Zelman choices.131 As I have suggested
earlier, the importance of any aspect of coercion is not that it need go so far as
to overcome the religious scruples of the person compelled nor invalidate a
waiver but that it casts a shadow on the alleged independence of the Zelman
choice.
131

In most ethical analyses, certainly those of a deontological bent, coercion is

an assault upon the autonomy of an individual with two elements usually as necessary
conditions: (1) a significant degree or kind of compulsion, and (2) an intention on the
part of the one compelling. See, e.g., Peter Westen, “Freedom and Coercion” –
Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1985 Duke law Journal 541, 589 (defined as a
constraint knowingly brought to bear on another to act in a way that that will leave the
other worse off).
In coercion in its pejorative sense the compulsion and the intention are
wrongful in degree or kind and is frequently discussed in conjunction with legal
standards for duress. See, e.g., Jeffrie G. Murphy, Consent, Coercion, and Hard
Choices, 67 Va. L. Rev. 79, 88 (1981)
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Hence, while there is general agreement that the government may
pursue goals with a carrot that it cannot attempt to achieve with a stick, in
statutory schemes where there is, so to speak, of a-carrot-with-a-stick-inside,
there seems no similar general agreement of how to cast the inquiry – with
focus on the loss or on the benefit. The greater/lesser powers argument has
inconsistent results. The more visceral attacks on conditioned benefits have
focused upon the coerciveness of the conditioned benefit, although the degree
and kind of coercion sufficient to invalidate is not easy to quantify and is
probably not reached in a case like Locke.
Moreover, for the greater/lesser argument, the coercion argument and
the waiver argument there is a good deal of confusion as to establishing the
baseline against which the putative loss of the right is to be measured.132 The
dissent may or may not have the better argument that the condition ought to
fail if properly subjected to heightened equal protection scrutiny but this is not
the only apparent hurdle for constitutionality because, as I see it, the Locke
majority has laid down more factors than simply the equal protection hurdle.
Hence, while a demonstration that a statute offends equal protection obviously
will invalidate an action, it is not necessary that a burden must rise to the level

132

See Kreimer at 1351-72.
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of invalidity under equal protection in order to be so excessive that it
undermines the requirement that a choice be “independent and genuine.”
The systemic argument reaches more of the Zelman concerns because
the Establishment clause is a systemic concern. Even more unambiguously
than Free Exercise or equal protection, the Establishment clause addresses the
constitutional design for government in the U.S. and its legitimate concerns.
Professor Sullivan’s approach directly addressed the legitimacy of government
pressure on citizen rights as a systemic matter.

The more the governmental

scheme systemically pressures and reduces the options realistically available to
the Zelman choosers, the weaker the rationale for recognizing a sanitizing
effect by the Zelman choices.
This argument is addressed, although not in this form, in Zelman itself.
Justice Souter’s dissent argued that the aid at issue in the Zelman predecessors
Mueller, Zobrest and Agostini was found by the court to be insubstantial
viewed systemically and did not have the effect of skewing choices.133 He
found the program in Zelman however to skew in favor of the participation of
parochial schools in the voucher plan because of the small amount of the
voucher subsidy, which closely approximated the relatively lower tuitions of
privates schools that were sectarian, and the large proportion of sectarian

133

Zelman at 2490
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schools participating in the voucher program.134 “The question is,” Justice
Souter stated “whether the private hand is genuinely free to send the money in
either a secular direction or a religious one.”135

The majority responded by

reiterating the facial neutrality of the statute at issue, which does not join the
issue, and re-evaluating the empirical data, which does.136
Similarly, the question in Locke v. Davey and other Zelman-style
Establishment clause cases cannot avoid the empirical facts regarding the
situation of the putative chooser, questions that cannot be addressed through
neutral principles nor the level of coercion required for Free Exercise tests
because, as was demonstrated above, the foundation of Zelman and the cases
upon which it depends are based upon defeasible presumptions the behaviors
of the actors involved and the systemic effect of the statute at issue.

III. “Play in the Joints”
A. The Source of the Metaphor
The case was Walz v. New York City and the language was
memorable:
The course of constitutional neutrality in this area [of
religious rights] cannot be an absolutely straight line;
134

Zelman at 2493-2495
Zelman at 2492
136
Zelman at 2460
135
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rigidity could well defeat the basic purpose of these
provisions, which is to insure that no religion be sponsored
or favored, none commanded, and none inhibited.

The

general principle deducible from the First Amendment and
all that has been said by the Court is this: that we will not
tolerate either governmentally established religion or
governmental religion. Short of those expressly proscribed
governmental acts there is room for play in the joints
productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit
religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without
interference.

137

In Walz a New York landowner and taxpayer challenged the property
tax exemption for churches in New York. His argument, as summarized by the
Supreme Court, was simply that the “grant of an exemption to church property
indirectly requires … a contribution to religious bodies and thereby violates
[the establishment clause].”138 That is, if a governmental forgoing of revenue
from the churches is to support them monetarily and support of religions is
prohibited by the constitution then, a priori, foregoing revenue is
137

Walz v. City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).

138

397 U.S. at 667
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constitutionally prohibited. Frederick Walz, appearing pro se, considered the
proposition -- that exempting churches from taxes was governmental support -sufficiently self-evident as to require no more than a 2 1/2 page appellate brief
to assert it.139

The New York Court of Appeals’ per curium opinion, as

though to return the favor, offered about the same amount of verbiage to
dismiss Walz’s claim out of hand, by citing precedent that supported the
constitutionality of the statutory exemption without venturing into the
arguments or logic of the decisions.140 Walz relied upon an a priori argument,
the Court on stare decisis, both rather rigid positions from a jurisprudential
139

Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 24 N.Y.2d 30, 31 (1969)

140

The Court of Appeals’ opinion in its entirety stated that:
Firmly embedded in the law of this State … is the doctrine that real
property owned by a religious corporation and used exclusively for
religious purposes is exempt from taxation [citations] and research
discloses – and the 2 1/2-page brief of the plaintiff-appellant herein
cites no authority to the contrary – that courts throughout the country
have long and consistently held that the exemption of such real
property does not violate the Constitution of the United States.
[citations omitted].

We see no reason for departing from this

conclusion in this case. Walz, 24 N.Y. 2d at 31.
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point of view and in their own way, apples and oranges. Because it did not
revisit the logic of the precedents, the Court of Appeals itself did not truly join
the question that Walz had raised; similarly Walz, by citing no precedent for
his position, did not join the Court’s argument.

When the matter was taken

up by the U.S. Supreme Court, the path not taken – a factual inquiry -- was
undertaken.
The Burger decision in Walz rejected Frederick Walz’s position by
disputing one premise that the logical argument rested upon -- that the
prohibitions in the religion clauses should be read as absolute; then the court
was free to review the aid factually and decide to reject Walz’s necessary
assumption that the tax breaks were “support” within the meaning of the
establishment clause.

Similarly, the Supreme Court rejected the Court of

Appeals’ simple reliance on precedent.

It was in rejecting these a priori

approaches141 that led the Supreme Court to wade into evaluating the realities
of the case’s facts. Herein is where the court found “play,” determining that

141

I consider the Court of Appeals’ argument to be a priori (or very nearly so) insofar

as their conclusion necessarily must flow from their premises that there is only
precedent supporting upholding the tax exemption and that precedent must be
followed. It leaves only the inquiry whether the statement about the precedents is
true.
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“the test will be one of degree,142” and what follows in the decision is a
weighing of the nature of the interaction permitted by the exemption statute.143
What I seek to emphasize at this point is this – the movement away
from absolutes and bright lines and towards weighting factors produces the
“play” that resolves Walz; but in order to be properly law like, predictable and
just, that “play” needs principles. Certainly the Walz decision goes on to lay
out some principles, just as Locke sets out its guidelines that are at the heart of
142

Walzat 678
143

The factors Walz took into consideration included a quantitative

effect:
Separation in this context cannot mean absence of all
contact; the complexities of modern life inevitably produce
some contact and the fire and police protection received by
houses of religious worship are no more than incidental
benefits accorded all persons and institutions within a
State’s boundaries, along with many other exempt
organizations. The appellant [Walz] has not established
even an arguable quantitative correlation between the
payment of an ad valorem property tax and the receipt of
these municipal benefits. Walz at 678.
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the enquiry in this article. Important to such facts-and-circumstances tests are
the acceptable ways in which factors are evaluated and, as I have argued supra,
the jurisprudence can be clouded by the use of presumptions and burden–
shifting.

Such rhetorical moves displace principled absolutes with under-

examined presumptive second cousins that only appear to be empirical; and
their employment should be viewed skeptically if “play” is not to become
synonymous with result-oriented arbitrariness.
To summarize my argument, the Supreme Court has developed a
mechanism, described herein as a Zelman choice, whereby disbursements from
the public fisc can be distributed to parochial pockets provided that the choice
of the recipient is left to individuals exercising an independent and genuine
power of choice. Such programs require that the relevant statute be for an
appropriate secular purpose and facially neutral, thereby satisfying the “secular
intent” prong of the Lemon test.
The “primary effect” and “entanglement” prongs of the Lemon test are
addressed (1) by a requirement that the scheme, even if retaining the possibility
of actions by state actors improper under the establishment clause, has so
reduced the arena of state activity that state actors presumed to be behaving
within the parameters of their regular duties would not be expected to engage
in such actions even if unpoliced; and (2) that the legislature has so distanced
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itself from the individual determinations of where and whether to divert to
funds to parochial institutions that the effect on their economic is truly out of
the state’s hands and in those of independent choosers and it would not be
reasonable to consider such an attenuated manner of payment “endorsement.”
This being the case, any substantial limit on the “independent chooser”
must be closely scrutinized. This is so not because the limits are a question of
facial neutrality, as the Locke court wrongly thought; nor because there may be
an unconstitutional impingement on the chooser’s personal rights. Rather, the
heightened scrutiny should be required because the limits undermine the
presumptions of chooser independence and governmental distance necessary
for an acceptable Zelman choice, which rests on a presumption of systemic
regularity.
Thus, in Locke v. Davey, a determination that Joshua Davey’s choices
were hampered in a manner that showed the sort of systemic deficiencies as
described above should undermine the applicability of Zelman because it
challenges Zelman’s necessary presumptions. Without the Zelman short-cut
through the effects and entanglement prongs of Lemon, the old rules apply:
there will have to be a showing of no primary effect and bearing the
entanglement risk in policing them.
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